Secured Traffic Monitoring in VANET by Roy, Ayan & Madria, Sanjay
Secured Traffic Monitoring in VANET
Ayan Roy
Department of Computer Science
Missouri University of Science and Technology, USA
ar3g3@mst.edu
Sanjay Madria
Department of Computer Science
Missouri University of Science and Technology, USA
madrias@mst.edu
Abstract—Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) facilitate
vehicles to wirelessly communicate with neighboring vehicles
as well as with roadside units (RSUs). However, an attacker
can inject inaccurate information within the network that can
cause various security and privacy threats, and also disrupt the
normal functioning of any traffic monitoring system. Thus, we
propose an edge cloud based privacy preserving secured decision
making model that employs a heuristic based on vehicular data
such as GPS location and velocity to authenticate traffic-related
information from the ROI under different traffic scenarios. The
effectiveness of the proposed model has been validated using
VENTOS, SUMO, and Omnet++ simulators, and also, by using
a simulated cloud environment. We compare our proposed model
to the existing state-of-the-art models under different attack
scenarios. We show that our model is effective and capable of
filtering data from malicious vehicles, and provide accurate traffic
information under the influence of at least one non-malicious
vehicle.
Index Terms—Secure, Privacy, Edge, VANET
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) allow wireless com-
munication from vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), and vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) such as with road side units (RSU) for
better traffic management. Using the dedicated short range
communication (DSRC) protocol, every vehicle broadcasts
information about traffic events such as accidents, traffic
congestion, and traffic violations to nearby vehicles as well as
road side infrastructures. However, the presence of malicious
vehicles at the region of interest (ROI) can negatively influence
the traffic monitoring of the region. Bluetooth based traffic
monitoring systems such as Clearview Intelligence’s M830
leverage the unique MAC address of Bluetooth devices inside
the car and their entry, exit times form the zones to determine
the traffic flow. However, the malicious vehicles can perform
Denial of Service attack by switching off their devices, on the
event of which the device records fewer vehicles within the
region. Also, a naive way of thinking to solve the problem is
to collect location and velocity information from vehicles and
discard inconsistent information with the RSU’s location and
speed. However, such a solution will not be effective where the
malicious vehicles send incorrect velocity information to the
RSU using V2I communication. A comprehensive review of
the solutions to preserve the privacy, authenticity and security
of the messages disseminated in VANET has been provided in
[1]. Existing strategies such as the peer authentication model
[2], threshold based or majority voting [3], and the reputation-
based system [4] provide traffic monitoring by assuming the
concept of adversarial parsimony [5] but it becomes challeng-
ing to validate the vehicular responses when the malicious
vehicles are in the majority. The majority of the vehicles can
be compromised when a group of malicious vehicles forming
the road network performs a collusion attack on the system.
Also, in the case of a small network, an attack can be prop-
agated among the majority of vehicles when a compromised
vehicle communicates using V2V communication to its nearby
vehicles, thus, compromising them.
An increase in the autonomy of vehicles makes the infras-
tructure even more vulnerable to security attacks. The remote
hacking of a Jeep Cherokee in 2015 [6] highlights the feasi-
bility of such attacks. Additionally, the breach in the privacy
of individual vehicle information can lead to unauthorized
tracking of officials as well as vehicles identity theft. The
purpose of an attacker is to profile a driver’s habits based
on GPS location, velocity, acceleration, and the unique ID of
the vehicle. Under such constraints, it is necessary to ensure
the anonymity of the vehicles and unlinkability of the shared
information to their originating vehicles. Anonymity ensures
that every vehicle remains anonymous while exchanging in-
formation whereas, unlinkability ensures the inability to trace
the identity of a vehicle based on the information exchanged
by it. Furthermore, such a system should ensure conditional
privacy, which means that the identity of the attacker can be
revealed in case of a conflict.
The United States Department of Transport (USDOT) in-
troduced Security Credential Management System (SCMS)
[7] that leverages V2V and V2I communication among ve-
hicles, and public key infrastructure (PKI) to ensure message
integrity, authenticity, privacy, and interoperability. Due to the
lack of misbehavior detection algorithm, if authentic vehicles
misbehave and provide inaccurate traffic-related information
from the ROI, there is no algorithm in place to validate
the information and filter the malicious vehicles and their
responses from the network, and thus, it can obtain inaccurate
traffic information. This problem is elevated even more if the
malicious vehicles at the ROI form the majority and try to
disrupt the traffic monitoring system. To address these short-
comings, we design a global misbehavior detection algorithm
which is yet to be defined by USDOT. We propose a secure and
privacy preserving decision making model by leveraging the
PKI and an edge cloud based infrastructure to validate traffic-
related information from the ROI and filter malicious vehicles,
even if they are in majority (like under collaborative or DDoS
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attack), within the ROI. Each edge server is associated with
a different region and is connected to a centralized server. By
leveraging the concept of the edge server, the decision making
model is brought closer to the concerned ROI, which reduces
the latency in the decision and reduces the bottleneck on the
centralized server. The main contributions of the proposed
work are as follows:
• Develop a privacy preserving and secure heuristic based
solution that overcomes the shortcomings of the current
state-of-the-art models and validates the traffic-related
information from the ROI using the recorded GPS loca-
tion of each vehicle, the vehicles’ velocity and encrypted
neighboring vehicles’ IDs under the influence of at least
one non-malicious vehicle within the ROI. It is unlike
the assumption of the majority of non-malicious vehicles
considered in other state-of-the-art models. We also con-
sider an event recorded by an individual vehicle because
the velocity of the vehicle may not always reflect the
event at that ROI (such as when a vehicle is moving with
a low velocity along the service lane in a non-congested
road).
• Design a dynamic data structure called the Decision Sim-
ilarity Graph based on the vehicle location, and leverage
the Point of Conflict concept to filter malicious vehicles
within the ROI using the conflicting event recorded by
any two neighboring vehicles.
• Validate the effectiveness of the proposed model as
compared to the other existing state-of-the-art models
under different scenarios using the simulations, and show
that the proposed model effectively validates the traffic-
related information and filters the malicious vehicles and
their responses from the network. The proposed model
has been compared against the state-of-the-art models
that leverage the V2X communication infrastructure to
validate the traffic-related information.
II. RELATED WORK
III. RELATED WORK
Here, we review some of the existing models and highlight
their merits and limitations under different scenarios.
A. Majority Voting Model or Threshold Based Model
A weighted majority voting based model has been proposed
in [8] where the majority of the vehicles are considered reliable
and the message generated by a vehicle closer to the event has
a higher weight than the vehicle at a distance. However, the
proposed model may result in an inaccurate data reporting if
the vehicle closer to the event is malicious or majority of the
vehicles are malicious. The authors in [9][3] have proposed
threshold based data authentication schemes in which a vehicle
considers a message as credible if it has been authenticated
by a threshold number of vehicles. However, the proposed
schemes are highly vulnerable to ballot stuffing, bad mouthing,
collusion, sybil attack and in situation when the number of
malicious or compromised vehicles authenticating an incorrect
message is greater than or equal to the threshold. A privacy-
preserving traffic monitoring system is proposed in [10] where
the vehicles share their speed information with the nearby
vehicles. To preserve the privacy, the speed information is
perturbed with noise and the security of the information is
ensured using homomorphic cryptosystem. The traffic scenario
of the region is decided by computing the average of the speed
information shared by all the vehicles in the region. However,
the proposed model inherently assumes that the vehicle does
not tamper its speed information to disrupt the traffic scenario
of the region.
B. Reputation Based Model
The authors in [4] have proposed a reputation based an-
nouncement scheme in which the credibility of the message
generated by a vehicle depends on the reputation score of the
vehicle which is obtained by the reliability of its broadcast
messages in the past. However, the model is susceptible to
on-off attack, where a vehicle with a high prior reputation
score performs maliciously or is compromised by an attacker.
C. Peer Authentication Model
A blockchain-based reputation system has been proposed
in [2] in which the credibility of the messages generated by
a vehicle is determined by the prior reputation of the vehicle
and by ratings from the nearby vehicles. The authors in [11]
has also proposed a distributed reputation management system
in which the credibility of the broadcast message originating
from a vehicle is determined by the ratings obtained from its
one-hop neighbors. The authors in [12] have also proposed
a peer authentication based trust management model based
on trust scores. However, the proposed models are highly
vulnerable to ballot stuffing and bad-mouthing attack, in which
the ratings of an individual vehicle can be influenced by nearby
vehicles. The proposed model also provides incorrect traffic
information when the majority of the vehicles are malicious
or are compromised by an attacker.
Our proposed model differs from the above mentioned
models/schemes in the following aspects: 1) involves no
peer authentication, majority voting, or threshold concept, 2)
can provide accurate information even when majority of the
vehicles are malicious or compromised.
IV. PRELIMINARIES, THREAT MODELS AND
ASSUMPTIONS
A. Preliminaries
• Edge Server: A trusted entity associated with a small
region, such as a down-town in a city, which analyzes
traffic events like accident or congestion. The edge server
is responsible for accurate traffic monitoring based on
the proposed heuristic, and it filters malicious data and
vehicles. The use of edge server scales the proposed
model for large VANETs using the distributed cloud
concept.
• Centralized Server: A trusted entity that is responsible for
analyzing the traffic scenario of a city, county or a state.
Since traffic congestion in a region has a cascading effect
on other surrounding regions, the decisions from different
edge servers deployed in small regions are analyzed by
the centralized server to generate an overview of a traffic
scenario for a large region.
• Decision Similarity Graph (DSG): The Decision Similar-
ity Graph (DSG), represented in Figure 1, is utilized by
the edge server to filter malicious vehicles within the ROI,
which is explained in section IV(c). DSG is an ordered
pair of the form:
DSG =< V,E >
where V=<V1, V2, V3,..., Vn> represent the n vehicles
from which the responses are received and E=<E1,
E2, E3,..., En> are undirected edges that represent the
neighborhood between any two vehicles.
Fig. 1: Decision Similarity Graph
• AES encryption algorithm [13]: Every vehicle, Vid, at
the ROI uses the AES 128 bit symmetric encryption
algorithm to generate a unique key, Keyi, which is used to
encrypt the vehicular data such as ID, GPS location, and
velocity before sending the data to the edge server via the
RSU. Since the AES 128 bit algorithm is faster than the
AES 192/256 bit key algorithms [14], and still provide
enough desired security, the proposed model reduces the
latency due to encryption.
• Schmidt-Samoa cryptosystem [15]: Every edge server
using the Schmidt-Samoa cryptosystem generates a pub-
lic key, Gpublic, and its associated private key, Gprivate,
which is utilized by the vehicles within the ROI for a
secure key, Keyi, exchange as well as for the privacy
preserved Vid broadcast to its neighboring vehicles. Edge
servers associated with different regions generate their
own Gpublic and Gprivate keys. We prefer the [15] over
RSA [16] because of its simplistic trapdoor one-way
permutation. Also, unlike Rabin [17], this algorithm does
not produce any ambiguity in the decryption at the cost of
the encryption speed. The Schmidt-Samoa cryptosystem
is also preferred over the elliptic-curve cryptosystem [18]
because of the implementation issues faced by the latter,
and also the lack of research on the latter cryptosystem
[19].
• Elgamal Digital Signature Scheme (EGDSS) [20]: Every
vehicle, Vid, before entering into a VANET communi-
cation, is registered with the trusted centralized server
using a private key, veh privatei, and its associated public
key, veh publici, which are generated using the EGDSS
algorithm. The veh privatei is loaded onto the on-board-
unit(OBU) of Vid which is used to authenticate its identity
to the edge server. Instead of EGDSS, the digital signa-
ture algorithm (DSA) [21] could also be used without
affecting the model’s effectiveness.
B. Threat Model
Malicious vehicles (1) can manipulate any recorded event
(including velocity and recorded GPS location) to disrupt
the decision making process, (2) may try to impersonate
some other vehicle by reporting some other Vid, and can also
send manipulated traffic-related information under different
registered Vids, (3) may intercept a data packet of any non-
malicious vehicle, modify the information, and send it to the
RSU for decision making, (4) may not send its vehicular data
to the RSU to degrade the traffic monitoring system.
C. Assumptions
We assume that the non-malicious vehicles always send
requested information to the edge server via the trusted RSU.
Every challenge and response packet is sent and received by
the RSU as well as by the vehicles. If a packet originating
from a vehicle is dropped due to a network problem or
channel congestion, it is neglected by the proposed model.
However, for the effectiveness of the proposed model, the
edge server must obtain at least one non-malicious response or
one conflicting neighbor of any malicious vehicle to validate
the traffic-related information from the ROI if it exists. The
vehicles are considered to have a unique ID (allocated by the
department of motor vehicles) of uniform length known by the
edge servers. The recorded event is either congested or non-
congested, defined based on the velocity of the vehicles within
the ROI in the proposed model (section IV c). The proposed
model is not appropriate for real-time decision making such
as turning the steering wheel or increasing the acceleration.
It is suitable in scenarios where the requesting vehicles want
to enter the ROI within approximately 5-10 minutes from the
time of the request.
V. PROPOSED MODEL
Figure 3 represents an overview of the proposed model
shown in Figure 2. It uses a privacy-preserving heuristic
that leverages the GPS location and velocity of the reporting
vehicle as well as encrypted neighboring Vid of the reporting
vehicle, i.e., vehicles that are within its transmission range
to validate traffic-related information at the ROI under the
presence of at least one non-malicious vehicle. A vehicle
requesting traffic-related information from an ROI sends a
request to the centralized server, which is relayed to the
associated edge server via a wireless communication. From
one edge server, the requesting vehicle can request the traffic
condition at another ROI under a different edge server. The
centralized server is directly associated with all edge servers.
Fig. 2: Overview of the proposed model
Fig. 3: Overview of the proposed model
A. Key Generation and Request Dissipation
The edge server associated with a ROI generates Gpublic and
its associated Gprivate using equations 1 and 2, respectively, as
defined by the Schmidt-Samoa cryptosystem.
Gpublic = p
2 ∗ q (1)
Gprivate = Gpublic
−1 mod (lcm(p− 1, q − 1)) (2)
where p and q are 2 large prime numbers chosen by the
edge server. Furthermore, the edge server broadcasts Gpublic
within the ROI via the RSUs.
B. Encrypted ID Broadcast and Response Acquisition
In the proposed heuristic, every vehicle needs to know the
encrypted Vids of its neighboring vehicles only when gen-
erating the data packet. This requirement has been justified
later in this section. To preserve the privacy in the proposed
model, after receiving the Gpublic, the vehicle encrypts its Vid
using Gpublic and generates enc id, which is defined as the
encrypted Vid as discussed in Algorithm 1 (lines 6-9), and
broadcasts it to its nearby vehicles. A vehicle having received
threshold number of enc ids from neighboring vehicles gener-
ates data packet that consists of the vehicle’s information. The
significance of threshold in the proposed model is to model the
size of the data packet in such a way that it consumes lesser
bandwidth to send the vehicular information by the RSU.
data packet =< V id, ds(V id), event, velid,
GPSid, enc ids, trajectory >
where ds(Vid) is defined as Vid digitally signed with
veh privatei for authenticating itself, enc ids refers to the
encrypted ids of the neighboring threshold vehicles, velid
and GPSid are the velocity and GPS location of the vehi-
cle respectively at the time of generating the data packet,
while the event field indicates the event recorded by the
Vid. We do not preexamine the recorded GPS location of
the vehicles and the proposed model does not deal with
the precision of the GPS location of a Vid, as the GPS
Algorithm 1 Generate enc id and τ for a vehicle
1: key[0− 9, A− Z, a− z] = [00− 09, 10− 35, 46− 71]
2: Keyi ← Key of a vehicle generated using AES 128
3: Key m ← Stores integer of Keyi using key[] of step 1
4: count ← length of(Vid) - 1
5: Key length ← length of(Keyi) - 1
6: for i in range of 0− length of(V id)− 1 do
7: msg = msg + (100count∗ascii of(Vid.charAt(i))
8: count- -
9: end for
10: enc id ← msgGpublic mod (Gpublic)
11: for i in range of 0− length of(Keyi) do
12: Keym = Keym+ (100Key length∗key[Keyi.charAt(i)]
13: Key length- -
14: end for
15: τ ← KeymGpublic mod (Gpublic)
16: return enc id, τ
location recorded is utilized to filter malicious vehicles in
the heuristic described later. The trajectory field describes the
trajectory of the vehicle to its destination that is leveraged
in section D.Thereafter, every Vid at the ROI generates its
Keyi and generates encrypted data packet consisting of every
information that needs to be sent to the edge server in the
encrypted form.
encrypted data packet =< τ, data packet‘ >
where τ is obtained by encrypting Keyi of a Vid with
Gpublic (Algorithm 1 lines 10-13) and data packet‘ is obtained
by encrypting data packet with Keyi. The purpose of this
step is to preserve the privacy and integrity of Keyi and the
data packet. This step also facilitates the secure key exchange
algorithm. Every Vid broadcasts the encrypted data packet
received by the nearby RSU. The RSU waits for σ seconds or
threshold number of encrypted data packets before sending
them to the edge server. The waiting time, σ, ensures that
the RSU constrains the time of the proposed model in case
the threshold packets take more time, especially in situations
where the traffic flow is low. On the other hand, if the traffic
flow is high, within σ time, the RSU can receive a large
number of encrypted data packets which can significantly
increase the length of the aggregated packet under which it
appends threshold encrypted data packets obtained before σ
seconds. Thus, using this trade-off, the RSU generates the
aggregate packet and sends it to the edge server.
aggregate packet =< rsu id, location,
encrypted data packets >
where rsu id and location are respectively the unique id
and location of the RSU sending the packets to the edge.
C. Point of Conflict Detection
The edge server, on receiving the aggregate packets from
the RSUs, extracts the rsu id and the location of the
RSU. Thereafter, it extracts the encrypted data packet from
the aggregate packets received. Furthermore, from the en-
crypted data packet, the symmetric key, Keyi, for every vehi-
cle is obtained by decrypting τ with Gprivate using Algorithm
2 (lines 4-5). Finally, the obtained Keyi of a vehicle is further
used to obtain data packet from data packet’ (Algorithm 2
line 6). Thus, the response of a vehicle remains private from
the RSU as well as from the nearby vehicles as Gprivate is only
possessed by the edge server. From every data packet, the
Vid is authenticated by the edge server by comparing ds(Vid)
with the Vid and its associated veh publici, which it receives
from the centralized server. The purpose of this step is to
filter malicious vehicles that are performing any masquerading
attack or identity theft. At first, the GPS location of a Vid is
compared with the location of the RSU. If the GPS location is
out of the transmission range of the RSU that records its data,
this implies that the vehicle is manipulating its GPS location
and it is filtered out as malicious. If not, the neighbors of a Vid
are obtained by the edge server using Algorithm 2 (lines 7-9).
Based on the neighbors extracted, the edge server constructs
a DSG where every Vid forms a vertex of the DSG, and it
has an undirected edge to its neighboring Vids. The undirected
DSG is used to obtain the Point of Conflict (POC), defined
as a situation where two neighboring vehicles, say Vi and Vj,
report a conflicting event like congestion and no-congestion,
respectively within the same ROI (lines 15-20) and under the
same RSU. The initial detection for POC is searched within
the neighbors using Algorithm 2 (lines 10-14). If no POC
is detected after the initial detection, a POC can still exist
among the vehicles within the same RSU (Algorithm 2 (lines
15-18)) if a malicious Vid intentionally chooses only malicious
neighboring Vids as analyzed in Property 1.
We consider Veh listm = {V m1, V m2, V m3, ...} to be a
set of malicious Vid, denoted by Vmi, whereas Veh listnm
= {V nm1, V nm2, V nm3, ...} is a set of non-malicious Vid,
denoted by Vnmi. The cardinality of a set S is denoted by
|S|. Γ(V mi) represents a set of Vmjs present in the neighbor
list of a Vmi and Veh listm ∩ Veh listnm = ∅, i.e, a Vid cannot
be malicious and non-malicious at the same time.
Property 1. Given a Vmi, it can have only Vmjs in its neighbor
list if threshold < |V eh listm|.
Proof. For threshold < |V eh listm|, consider the value of
threshold to be |V eh listm|-1 , i.e, the maximum allowable
threshold under the constraint.
For a given Vmi, Vmi ∪ Γ(V mi) = V eh listm,
when the value of threshold = |V eh listm| − 1, meaning
that the neighbor list of a Vmi can include all other Vmj to
avoid the detection of POC.
Vmi ∪ Γ(V mi) ⊂ V eh listm,
when the value of threshold < |V eh listm| − 1, meaning
that the neighbor list of a Vmi can include some Vmj to avoid
the detection of POC.
For threshold > |V eh listm|, consider the value of
threshold to be |V eh listm|+1 , i.e, the minimum allowable
threshold under the constraint.
∴ , V eh listm ⊂ V mi ∪ Γ(V mi)
This means a Vmi will have a Vnmi in its neighbor list, under
which the condition given below holds.
V m
i ∪ Γ(V mi) ⊂ V eh listm ∪ V eh listnm
Algorithm 2 Obtaining data packet and Detecting POC
1: key[0− 9, A− Z, a− z] = [00− 09, 10− 35, 46− 71]
2: dec id ← decrypted enc id, POC detected ← false
3: neighbor of Vi ← neighboring vehicle of a Vid
4: for every τ received do
5: Key1i ← key[τGprivate mod (p*q)]
6: end for
7: data packet ← decrypt data packet‘ with Key1i
8: for every enc id in data packet do
9: dec id← enc idGprivatemod(p ∗ q)
10: neighbor of Vi ← ascii characters of(dec id)
11: end for
12: for every data packet obtained from Vi do
13: for every Vj in neighbor of Vi do
14: if Vi.event 6= Vj.event then
15: POC detected = true, CV1 ← Vi, CV2 ← Vj
16: go to Line 19
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
20: for any 2 vehicles, Vk and Vm under same rsuid do
21: if Vk.event 6= Vm.event then
22: POC detected = true, CV1 ← Vk, CV2 ← Vm
23: go to Line 19
24: end if
25: end for
26: return POC detected, CV1, CV2
Thereafter, if no POC is detected at all, it considers the
similar event recorded by all the vehicles to be the event of the
ROI. However, if a POC is detected, the edge performs initial
scrutiny based on the information obtained from the vehicles
in conflict as described below. During the initial scrutiny,
the approximate velocity of a vehicle in a congested road is
considered velcongested, while the velocity in a non-congested
road is considered veln-congested, with an allowable difference
of  mph to accommodate any minor variations.
1) If event recorded by a vehicle, say V1, is congested, and
its corresponding vel1 is greater than velcongested+, then
V1 is considered malicious, and the Vid in conflict with
V1 is considered non-malicious.
2) If event recorded by a vehicle, say V1, is non-congested,
and its corresponding vel1 is less than veln-congested−,
then V1 is considered malicious, while the Vid in conflict
with V1 is considered non-malicious.
Subsequently, the malicious vehicles are filtered from the
network using Algorithm 4 (lines 10-12), and the decision
is made based on the non-malicious vehicles. However, if no
decision is made after initial scrutiny, the server generates a
challenge pkt obtained using Algorithm 3 (line 17), consisting
of Vids in conflict, and the RSUs under which the conflicting
Vids are expected to appear after timeid is calculated based
on the velids, the trajectory of the vehicle and the GPSids of
the Vids. The purpose of the challenge pkt is to authenticate
the velid and GPSid recorded by the vehicle and to allow the
Vids to prove its event recorded as it is assumed to travel with
almost the same velid.
challenge pkt =< CV 1, expected rsu1, time1,
CV 2, expected rsu2, time2 >
Algorithm 3 Generating the challenge packet
1: Initialize time t, RSUList ← list of every rsu id
2: for every CVi do
3: calculated distance ← t ∗ velid
4: expected locationi ← calculated distance + GPSid
5: for every rsui ∈ RSUList in trajectory do
6: if expected locationi is within rsui.location then
7: if CVi.event = ”congested” then
8: timei = t, expected rsui = rsui
9: go to Line 17
10: else
11: expected rsui = rsui
12: for every rsuj beyond rsui do
13: timei = t, expected rsui =
expected rsui + rsuj
14: end for
15: go to Line 17
16: end if
17: else
18: t+ +
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: challenge packet = CVi+timei+expected rsui/s
23: return challenge packet
Based on the contents of the challenge pkts, the ex-
pected rsu1 should obtain a response from CV1, i.e. the ID
of one of the vehicles in conflict, after time, time1, while the
expected rsu2 should obtain a response from CV2, i.e. the ID
of the other vehicle in conflict, after time, time2. To handle
the case of overspeeding by a CVi recording ”non-congested”,
every RSU along the direction of CVi, obtained from its
velocity, dissipates the challenge pkt (Algorithm 3 lines 12-
14). This ensures that even if a CVi passed by expected rsui
before timei, it still gets the challenge packet, as over speeding
is only possible in a non-congested road.
D. Challenge Packet Dissemination and Response
Upon receiving a challenge pkt from the edge server, an
RSU generates a crypto challenge packet and broadcasts it
after timei. The crypto challenge is generated based on the
CVi assigned to it, and its purpose is to verify the presence
of a vehicle within a specific region after timei seconds.
This is leveraged in the proposed heuristic to filter the
malicious vehicles within the network. Every vehicle at the
ROI sends a crypto response, defined as the unique response
sent by Vid in response to the crypto challenge packet. The
crypto challenge packet is obtained by using bitwise manipu-
lation (left shift operation) over the XOR cipher technique. The
XOR cipher technique is computationally inexpensive and easy
to implement. Furthermore, since every RSU dissipates the
crypto challenge packet exactly once in the proposed model, it
is less susceptible to frequency analysis attacks and also man-
in-the-middle attacks. The bitwise manipulation is to enhance
the security of the crypto challenge after the XOR operation.
crypto challenge = CV i ⊕ (testing word <<
leftnum) leftnum ∈ [1, length of testing word− 1]
where testing word is any arbitrary word chosen by a RSU
having the same length as its assigned CVi and leftnum refers
to the number of left shift operations performed, which is
chosen arbitrarily by the RSU.
Thereafter, upon receiving the crypto challenge packet from
the nearby RSU, every vehicle generates the crypto response
packet and broadcasts it. The purpose of the crypto response
packet is to validate the presence of CVi at a specific location.
crypto response = V id ⊕ crypto challenge
The expected rsuis waits for additional σ seconds to receive
the crypto response packets from the Vids. This is done to
make reparation for a minor change in velCVi that may occur
due to any trivial circumstance that does not affect the event at
the ROI. However, it is assumed that velCVi changes by a factor
of atmost  that still adheres to the decision recorded by CVi.
Thereafter, the RSU compares the crypto response received
from every Vids with the testing word. The testing word only
matches with a specific CVi. The associative and commutative
nature of the XOR operation facilitates the effective analysis
of the crypto responses obtained.
Finally, the expected rsuis generates the vehicle search
packet, which is sent to the edge server. The vehicle search
packets report whether a CVi was present within the transmis-
sion range of expected rsui within timei + σ.
vehicle search =< rsuid, CV i, response >
where response can be received indicating that a CVi is
present within the range of expected rsui within timei +σ, or
not received which indicates that the vehicle was absent.
E. Decision Making by Edge Server
The edge server, on receiving the vehicle search packets
from expected rsuis, makes a decision about traffic conditions
and filters malicious vehicles based on the heuristic depicted
in Figure 4. According to the proposed heuristic:
• If crypto response has been received from one CVi and is
not received from the conflicting CVi, then the CVi from
which the crypto response has been received is consid-
ered non-malicious and the conflicting CVi is considered
malicious. Consequently, all the malicious vehicles with
similar events recorded as the malicious CVi are filtered
using Algorithm 4 (lines 10-12). The decision is made
based on the decision of the non-malicious CVi.
• If crypto response has been received by both CVis,
then the edge server assumes that the CVi providing
crypto response with low veli intentionally reduced its
Fig. 4: Decision Tree for analysis
velocity to prove itself non-malicious. Under such a sce-
nario, the decision made is ”non- congested”. Thereafter,
every malicious vehicle is filtered using Algorithm 4
(lines 10-12).
Algorithm 4 Filtering using DSG
1: CVi ← malicious vehicle detected, stack.push(CVi)
2: mal list ← malicious Vid list, mal list.append(CVi)
3: nonmal list ← non malicious Vid list
4: filter[Vids] = false, filter[CVi] = true
5: while stack not empty do
6: CVi=stack.pop()
7: for every Vid in DSG do
8: if hasEdge( Vid , CVi) and filter[Vid]==false then
9: stack.push(Vid)
10: if CVi.event==Vid.event then
11: if CVi== malicious then
12: mal list.append(Vid)
13: else
14: nonmal list.append(Vid)
15: end if
16: else
17: nonmal list.append(Vid)
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: end while
22: return mal list, nonmal list
F. Response from Edge to Centralized Server
The traffic-related information from the ROI that has been
identified by the edge servers is sent to the centralized server.
The centralized server sends traffic-related information to
the requesting vehicle in case of an ad hoc request, or the
information is stored for traffic monitoring. The centralized
server observes the traffic using the majority selection method
and decides that the traffic scenario of multiple regions is
the one reported by the majority of the edge servers. This
is because the traffic condition in one region may have a
cascading effect on the other regions. The centralized server
in the proposed model is free from any bottleneck issues,
which may have resulted on account of enormous requests
about different ROIs. In the proposed model this is handled by
different edge servers, and it also allows graceful degradation
as the entire system will not falter if one edge server is faulty.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Experiments were conducted under both congested and non-
congested road conditions. The road network was simulated
using SUMO [22], while the communication network was
simulated using Omnet++ and VENTOS simulators. The cen-
tralized server (cloud) and the edge server were simulated in
separate workstations. In our simulation, we assumed roads
that have a speed limit between 70 mph and 40 mph. In other
words, the roads where vehicles travel below 35 mph are
assumed to be congested whereas the roads where vehicles
travel within the speed limit are non-congested. Based on the
experiments performed under the parameters in Table I, it
was observed that with the value of σ that were less than 10
seconds, the proposed model obtained the packets as desired.
The responses of any of the CVi did not reach the nearby
RSU within time with any values of σ lesser than 10 seconds.
This is because on many occasions the channel remained busy
transferring packets and because of this, the crypto response
had to wait in the pipeline as the simulator prevents any packet
collision in the channel. The value of  in the proposed model
can be decided based on where it is deployed and can be
adjusted without any change in the performance of the model.
However, for the experimentation, we considered the value
to be 5 mph. The proposed model has been compared against
TABLE I: Simulation Environment and Parameters
Consecutive RSU distance 1000 ∼ 2500 meters
RSU interference distance 510.5 meters(default simulator value)
Vehicles at ROI 100
Value of σ 10
Value of threshold 3 vehicle data
Transmission Power 20mW (default simulator value)
Vehicle transmission range 510.5 meters (default simulator value)
Communication Protocol IEEE 802.11p (default simulator value)
Communication channel Dedicated Short Range Communication (default simulator value)
various other models using Detection Accuracy as represented
in Figure 6. Detection Accuracy is a metric that is used to
detect accurate road conditions under a varied percentage of
malicious vehicles.
Detection Accuracy = road condition% of malicious vehicles
where Detection Accuracy ∈ {1,0,0.5}
A value of 1 indicates that the accurate road condition
and the malicious vehicles are detected while 0 indicates
neither the road condition nor the malicious vehicles could be
detected. A value of 0.5 indicates that the decision making is
conditional, and it is either dependent on the prior reputation
of vehicles (in the case of a reputation based system), the
distribution of malicious vehicles (in the case of a peer
authentication system) or has an equal percentage of malicious
as well as non-malicious vehicles (in the case of a majority
voting approach).
From Figure 6, it can be seen that the majority voting
model and the peer authentication model have higher De-
tection Accuracy when the majority of the vehicles within
the ROI are non-malicious (greater than 50%). Under such
cases, the decision of the non-malicious vehicles that are in
the majority dominates the decision of the malicious vehicles.
However, it becomes conditional when the number of mali-
cious and non-malicious vehicles within the ROI are equal, as
the non-malicious vehicles do not form a majority, and hence
no proper decision could be made. Thereafter, as the number
of malicious vehicles increases beyond 50%, it is seen that the
Detection Accuracy decreases as the malicious vehicles form
the majority under such scenarios. This influences the decision
making process within the ROI. The Detection Accuracy of
the Reputation Based model is always 0.5. This is because
the decision is highly based on the reputation of the vehicles
within the ROI. It is possible to have less malicious vehicles
with a higher prior reputation (for instance, 5 malicious
vehicles out of 100 vehicles with high rating) to dominate the
majority of non-malicious vehicles with no prior reputation
(for instance, 95 non-malicious vehicles out of 100 vehicles
with no reputation). Thus, under such a system, the decision
making model remains conditional. It is also to be noted that
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Fig. 5: Comparison of Detection Accuracy of various models
the number of broadcasts required in the proposed model
by the vehicles is comparatively less compared to the peer
authentication model, as shown in Figure 7. Furthermore, we
see that the peer authentication model has an equal number
of broadcasts per vehicle compared to the Proposed Model
Lower, especiallyduring the initial scrutiny phase when the
threshold ≤ 2. However, the number of broadcasts required
for decision making in the peer authentication model becomes
equal to the Proposed Model Upper if the challenge response
packet is generated with threshold = 3, and it exceeds the
Proposed Model Upper when the threshold becomes > 3.
This is because every vehicle has to authenticate threshold
number of vehicles in the peer authentication model, which
increases with the increase in threshold and with the number
of vehicles at the ROI. The value of threshold represents the
number of neighboring vehicles that needs to be authenticated
by a vehicle as well as the number of vehicular response
sent by the RSU to the edge in one time period. Since
the proposed model involves no peer authentication, every
vehicle within the ROI has to broadcast twice during the initial
scrutiny phase, and thrice if challenge response is generated.
However, the proposed model has more broadcast messages
per vehicle compared to the majority voting and the reputation-
based model. This is because the majority voting model and
the reputation-based model involve no V2V communication,
and every vehicle has to broadcast its decision only once.
Furthermore, we formulate the total broadcast required for
the various models shown in Table II, where n represents the
number of vehicles within the ROI and nrsu represents the
number of RSUs deployed within the ROI.
In the case of majority voting and reputation-based models,
every vehicle within the ROI sends their response to the RSU
that has a total of n transmissions. Thereafter, the RSU sends
threshold number of vehicular responses to the edge server
at one time. Hence, all the packets are sent after nthreshold
times. Therefore, the total number of transmissions required
is n+ nthreshold .
In the peer authentication model, every vehicle at the ROI
authenticates threshold number of vehicles. Therefore, the
number of authentication transmissions are n ∗ threshold.
Thereafter, the RSU sends all the packets to the edge server
after n∗thresholdthreshold times, i.e., n times. Thus, the total number
of transmissions required in the peer authentication model is
(n∗threshold)+n, which is equivalent to n∗(1+threshold).
In our proposed model, every vehicle sends its enc id to
its neighbor and thereafter, it sends the encrypted packet to
the RSU. Therefore, for every vehicle, it involves 2 trans-
missions. For n vehicles, the total transmissions are 2 ∗ n.
The transmissions required by RSUs to send n packets to
the edge server is nthreshold . Thereafter, the initial scrutiny is
performed. If the decision is made after initial scrutiny using
the proposed model, we obtain the lower bound, Proposed
Lower, on the transmissions, which is (2 ∗ n) + nthreshold .
However, when the challenge response phase is executed,
the challenge packet is sent to the nrsu RSUs by the edge
server in one transmission, which is dissipated within the ROI.
nrsu RSUs broadcast the crypto challenge packet and receive
the crypto response packets from n vehicles. Therefore, the
total transmissions are n + nrsu + 1. Finally, nrsu RSUs
send their response to the edge server in nrsu transmissions.
Under the challenge response phase, we obtain the upper
bound on the transmissions of the proposed model, Proposed
Upper, which is 2 ∗ n + nthreshold + 2 ∗ nrsu + n + 1. Based
on the formulation, we find from Figure 8 that the total
energy required for the transmission by the majority voting
and reputation-based models are the least compared to the
proposed model and the peer authentication model. This is
because they involve no V2V communication. Therefore, with
fewer number of broadcast, the transmission energy used is
also less. However, our proposed model has fewer number of
broadcast in both initial scrutiny (Proposed Lower) and when
the challenge response is generated (Proposed Upper) than the
peer authentication model because every vehicle has a fewer
broadcast requirement, i.e., two broadcasts in Proposed Lower
and three broadcasts in Proposed Upper. Hence, it requires
less transmission energy compared to the peer authentication
model, where every vehicle has to authenticate threshold
number of neighboring vehicles. The time taken by our
proposed model is highly dependant on the POC detection.
It is noted from Figure 9 (plotted based on Table III) that the
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TABLE II: Total number of broadcasts
Majority Voting (n+ nthreshold )
Reputation Based (n+ nthreshold )
Peer Authentication (n*(1+threshold))
Proposed Lower (2*n+ nthreshold )
Proposed Upper (2*n+ nthreshold +2*nrsu+n+1)
detection time for our model increases with the POC distance
(the point where two vehicles conflict in event reporting as
detected by the edge). This is because only when the POC
is detected, the edge server begins the various steps in our
proposed model for detecting the road condition, and filtering
out malicious vehicles. When the POC is detected early, i.e.,
within less POC distance, the edge proceeds with the initial
scrutiny and thereafter, the challenge response packet may be
generated. However, with the increase in the POC distance,
the edge server has to wait longer before executing the initial
scrutiny phase. It can also be seen from Table III that the
time taken is less dependant on the consecutive RSU distances
compared to the POC distances during Proposed Lower. This
is because even if the RSUs are close to each other, the edge
server still has to detect a POC before the initial scrutiny
phase is executed. The Proposed Upper with a consecutive
RSU distance of 2500 and a POC distance of 10 in Table
III takes less time (79 seconds) compared to the Proposed
Lower with a consecutive RSU distance of 1000 and a POC
distance of 20 (82.5 seconds). This is because in the latter
scenario, the initial POC takes time to be detected by the edge.
Therefore, a scenario having RSUs close to each other with
a higher POC distance may take more time than a scenario
with relatively distant consecutive RSUs but with less POC
distance. Also, in the initial scrutiny phase, the time taken does
not depend on the RSU distances (all the Lower values from
Table III take the same time for detection for a given POC
distance). This is because the vehicle responses is leveraged to
make the decision after they are sent to the edge server. The
RSU distance is impactful only when the challenge response
packet is generated (all the Upper values from Table III
take different times for detection for a given POC distance).
Through experiments, it was observed that the proposed model
performs faster when the vehicles remain under some RSU
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mission
throughout their travel. This is because if the vehicles are
out of the transmission range of the RSU, it has to wait to
arrive near the next RSU before sending their corresponding
packets, which increases the latency. In the experiments, every
vehicle remained under the transmission range of the RSU
throughout their travel when they were placed 1000 metres
apart, and it was observed that 1000 Upper as shown in Table
III has the fastest performance when compared to 2500 Upper,
2000 Upper, and 1500 Upper, i.e., when the consecutive RSU
distances were 2500 metres, 2000 metres, and 1500 metres
apart, respectively. In Figure 9, Upper represents the total
time taken for decision making when the challenge response
packet is generated, while Lower represents the time taken for
decision making during the initial scrutiny phase. Table III
TABLE III: Time taken (in seconds) to detect traffic conditions
with varying RSU and POC distances
hhhhhhhhhhhhRSU Distance
POC Distance
10 15 20 25 30 35 40
2500 Lower 21 53 84 104.0 190.3 256 326.8
2500 Upper 79 111 141 162.0 248.3 313 384.3
2000 Lower 23 54 84.33 102 193.67 254 327
2000 Upper 69 101 130.33 147 239.67 301 375
1500 Lower 22 55 82 101.7 192.5 257 327
1500 Upper 59 92 120 138.7 230.5 294.85 366
1000 Lower 24 55 82.5 103.2 194.2 257 326
1000 Upper 53 83 111.5 132.2 222.2 286 354
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also reveals the limitation of the proposed model. It can be
seen that the time taken to detect the traffic condition is not
in real time. This is because the amount of time lapsed in
sending the data packets and detecting the traffic condition
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Fig. 9: Detection probability with respect to time
is not real time. Thus, this restricts the application of the
model in scenarios that do not require real time decisions.
This is justified by the fact that the ROI is usually very large,
and the main purpose of the proposed model is mainly to
allow the vehicles in one ROI to know the traffic scenario
of another ROI that it wants to enter. However, the proposed
model cannot be applied in autonomous vehicles that require
decisions in negligible time, such as turning the steering wheel
or braking on the road. Based on the values in Table III,
the detection probability (defined as the ratio of the number
of observations where the road condition is detected within
a time limit to the total number of observations) is shown
in Figure 8. It is to be noted that as the time increases,
detection probability increases. This is because with more
time, conflicting vehicles at a higher POC distance are also
considered that increase the accuracy of the model. Hence,
the probability of finding a POC and detecting more scenarios
increases as more POC distances are covered, and eventually,
it leads to an increase in the detection probability at the cost
of time. For example, in Table III, the number of observations
with the time limit below 50 seconds is 4 (21,23,22,24). This
means that 4 out of 56 observations (50% of the observations
with POC distance 10) is detected within 50 seconds, thereby
covering approximately 7% of the total observations that
detect the road condition with a detection probability of 0.07.
However in Table III, the number of observations detected
below 100 seconds is 16, which covers every observation with
the POC distance of 10, 80% of the observations with the
POC distance of 15, and about 50% of the observations with
the POC distance of 20. This covers almost 28.6% of the
total observations in Table III (detection probability is 0.28)
as compared to 7%, when the time limit was below 50 seconds.
detection probability = total detections under certain timetotal possible detections
VII. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF OUR MODEL
A. Security Analysis
1) Message and GPS information spoofing attack: In our
proposed model, every vehicle records an event and generates
a data packet. In order to disrupt the decision making process,
it can report an inaccurate event, i.e., report a congestion when
the road is non-congested. For the attack to be successful,
every vehicle at the ROI must spoof the event, which would
incapacitate the edge server to detect any POC. However, this
contradicts our assumption that at least one vehicle must be
non-malicious. Furthermore, an attacker may spoof the GPS
information, i.e., sent manipulated velid and GPSid to the edge
server. However, in the proposed heuristic, the edge server
leverages velid and GPSid to generate the challenge packet to
filter malicious vehicles within the ROI. Thus, our proposed
model is secure against message and GPS information spoof-
ing attack.
2) Masquerading, Collusion and Sybil attack: In the pro-
posed model, every vehicle digitally signs its Vid using
veh privatei generated using EGDSS to produce ds(Vid). An
attacker can forge the signature if it can compute veh privatei
of the attacked Vid or by performing hash collision attack.
However, SHA-3 [23] is secured against a collision attack,
preimage [24] and second preimage attack[25] with the se-
curity strength varying from 112-256 bits for collision and
224-512 bits for preimage and second preimage attack. An
attacker may also perform collusion or a sybil attack to disrupt
the decision making process. However, for the attack to be
successful, every Vids within the ROI must be malicious.
This contradicts our assumption of having one non-malicious
vehicle within the ROI. Thus, the proposed model is secured
against masquerading, collusion and sybil attacks.
3) Message Integrity Attack: In the proposed model,
every vehicle sends encrypted data packet =<
τ, data packet‘ > to an edge server. If an attacker
wants to violate the integrity of a data packet generated by
a Vid, he/she must acquire Gprivate stored only at the edge
server, i.e. an attacker has to compute p and q used by
the edger server to generate Gprivate. However, this violates
the discrete logarithm problem [26]. An attacker may try to
compute Keyi generated using AES 128 to obtain data packet.
However, supercomputer will take around 1 billion years
to brute-force the key [27] while the biclique attack [28]
requires a computational complexity of 2126.1, which is highly
unlikely to break in real-time. Thus, our proposed model is
resilient against message integrity attack.
4) DoS attack: Let us assume that the number of vehicles
within the ROI is Vnum.The various combinations of malicious
vehicles not sending the packet to the edge server, defined as
C(DoS), is given by:
C(DoS) =
∑V num
i=1
(
V num
i
)
C(DoS) represents the different number, ranging from 0
to Vnum, of vehicles that can refrain from sending the in-
formation to the edge server via the RSU. However, DoS
is possible only when every vehicle within the ROI drops
their data packets. Thus, the probability of the DoS attack
being successful, defined as P(DoS), contradicts our assump-
tion that every non-malicious vehicle sends their packets, at
least one packet will be received by the edge server, and
also that one non-malicious vehicle should be present within
the ROI. Thus, the proposed model prevents DoS attacks.
P (DoS) = 1C(DoS)
B. Privacy Analysis
1) Conditional Privacy Preservation: In our proposed
model, every vehicle generates enc id by encrypting its Vid
with Gpublic. If an attacker attempts to track the Vid of a vehicle,
it has to compute Gprivate using the associated value of prime
numbers, p and q, possessed only by the edge server. In order
to breach the privacy of the data packet of a vehicle, it has
to obtain the Keyi, generated using AES 128, used by a Vid
to encrypt the data packet. Even under such a scenario, the
attacker has to compute Gprivate as Keyi is encrypted using
Gpublic. Thus, the proposed model guarantees anonymity and
unlinkability of a vehicle. However, the edge server filters
malicious vehicles using the DSG. Thereafter, it is stored in
the centralized server for future reference. Thus, the proposed
model also guarantees conditional privacy, and only reveals the
identity of the malicious vehicles when it detects a conflict.
P (DoS) = 1C(DoS)
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy preserving secure
edge cloud-assisted traffic monitoring system for VANETs that
provides accurate traffic-related information . The proposed
model is resilient against privacy attacks and unauthorized
tracking, and is secured against collusion, masquerading, ballot
stuffing, and bad mouthing attacks. We used DSG and the
challenge-response strategy to filter malicious responses, and
to determine accurate traffic-related information with fewer
number of broadcasts per vehicle compared to the peer au-
thentication model. Even though the number of broadcasts
per vehicle required for the proposed model is higher than
the majority voting model and the reputation based model,
the proposed model has a higher detection accuracy when
the number of malicious vehicles forms the majority within
the ROI. This means that unlike the majority voting and the
reputation-based model, the proposed model filters malicious
vehicles and accurately detects the traffic condition under the
influence of at least one non-malicious vehicle. In future, we
plan to extend our work using untrusted RSUs distributed
sparsely throughout the ROI, such as in semi-urban and
rural areas, which delays the information exchange between
the vehicle and the RSU. We will also design an intrusion
detection system (IDS) for the in-vehicle network that can
detect any fabricated information injected within the a vehicle
without any V2X communications.
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